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Collectivities and Tacit Knowledge 
Harry Collins 
 
I think the best I can do is just start with the final contribution (by Moody) and use its themes to 
provide the framework for an explanation of where I stand.  I would certainly like everyone to 
know whether they agree or disagree with me as I think striving for clarity is fundamental value 
of the scientific form of life and I consider my work to be informed by scientific values.  That is, 
I intend my work to be repeatable by anyone who puts themselves in the same position even 
though my empirical sociology uses what are generally referred to as ‘subjective’ methods: I 
hang around and interact with the people I am trying to understand until I understand them.  
This method, incidentally, is integrally related to what I think about the nature of collectivities.  I 
think collectivities are our major source of knowledge.  Now, Moody says ‘no one has been able 
to persuade me that Collins does not really mean that collectivities perform acts of knowing.’  I 
think Moody is going in the right direction in terms of the strength of the views he imputes to me 
but to say that collectivities ‘perform actions’ seems wrong.  In so far as I understand the term 
‘action’ – and I have co-authored a book about it with a very serious philosopher (Collins and 
Kusch, 1998, The Shape of Actions) – an action is intimately related to an intention and to assign 
an intention to a collectivity also seems wrong.  Actions are usually said to be performed by 
individuals.  In the same way, it would be strange to suggest that collectivities can fall in love. 
But, when I am doing my empirical sociological work what I am investigating is the set of 
plausible intentions that collectivities make available individuals; falling in love is one of them.  
Thus, though collectivities cannot fall in love, the locus of the idea of love is the collectivity – 
that is where love comes from.   
In the spring of 2017, Gravity’s Kiss, my book on the September 14th 2015 detection of 
gravitational waves, should be published; it will be based on my embedding in the community of 
gravitational wave scientists from the very first hours of the discovery.  What it will describe is a 
change in the nature of the collectivity we inhabit from one where reports of the terrestrial 
detection of gravitational waves are largely to be disbelieved to one where they are largely to be 
believed.  It’s quite a change.  You, dear reader, know almost nothing about gravitational waves 
yet your ‘taken for granted reality’ – your tacit knowledge – has changed or will shortly have 
changed.  The locus of this change is the rapidly reforming collectivity of scientists and their 
wider public.   
Here is a passage from the unpublished manuscript of the new book explaining both the point and 
the methodology a little further – it refers back to a much earlier events in the half-century history 
of gravitational wave detection which I have been analysing almost since the beginning: 
at one point, under Robbie Vogt’s regime, Ron Drever was locked out of his office 
(Gravity’s Shadow p 575); Drever and many others thought it was an act intended to 
demean him while another group thought that the locks were changed as a matter of 
routine maintenance.  I could have found out which it was by exploring documents in 
Caltech’s maintenance department but I did not bother because all I needed to know 
was that relations were such that it was possible to believe either account – exactly 
which one was true didn’t really matter so long as either could be believed. 
Deliberately locking Ron Drever out of his office would have been an action carried out by 
Robbie Vogt and changing the locks as a matter of routine maintenance would also have been 
an action carried out by someone but the existence of a collective atmosphere in which it was 
reasonable to believe that Robbie could have locked Ron out of his office deliberately was 
not anyone’s action, it was the condition for the existence of that kind of intention and action.  
The same applies to taking out mortgages in Western societies and divining witches using the 
poison oracle in certain other societies; you cannot have the corresponding intentions unless 
you are member of the corresponding societies.  Collectivities are the locus of this kind of 
knowledge; they are, to repeat, the place where this kind of knowledge resides while we 
individual parasites draw upon it, usually in a tacit way.  This does not mean collectivities 
perform acts of knowing. 
Maybe, however, I am being inconsistent because I have argued that we might think of 
collectivities as extended neural nets – the neural nets inside the skulls of the individuals that 
belong to collectivities being linked into one extended net via speech and the other senses.  If 
a collectivity is a super-organism of this kind, why shouldn’t it have intentions of its own and 
why shouldn’t collectivities be able to fall in love?  The answer is that there are no societies 
made up of collectivities; there is no similar collectivity for a neural net to fall in love with.  
So it that is why a collectivity cannot fall in love – the concept does not exist at the collective 
level in a way that would allow it to be acted upon and the same will go for other human 
intentions.  That still leaves the collectivity as the locus of those intentions.  Without the 
ocean there would be no waves but that does not mean the ocean must be a massive wave.     
I readily concede that of the three books under consideration mine (Tacit and Explicit 
Knowledge) is the worst as an introduction to Polanyi’s thought.  Indeed, I am flattered that 
my book is even being thought of in this way since it was never intended to be an elaboration 
of Polanyi’s work.  My thinking began with Peter Winch’s Idea of a Social Science which led 
on to Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations with Durkheim being added to the mix 
along the way.  It was only later that a referee of my first paper told me that I was also 
dealing with Polanyi and tacit knowledge but the ‘personal knowledge’ dimension of Polanyi 
is always a trouble when people think I am ‘doing Polanyi’.   
Individual actions are, in principle, of no interest to me.  In practice they are of great interest 
because they are the only way we can tap into the nature of the collectivities of which 
individuals are the ‘symptom’.  Look – the relationship is dead simple: I want to know where 
the collectivity of native English speakers puts the verb in the sentence; I ask a native English 
speaker or two to speak some sentences and I note that the verb comes in the middle.  I do not 
say ‘English speakers have personal knowledge of verb positioning in English’; I do not say 
the collectivity of native English speakers knows that the verb goes in the middle of the 
sentence’; I say, ‘In English the verb goes in the middle’ and that is shorthand for saying ‘if 
you are a member of English speaking society, when you speak a sentence your intention 
(usually tacit) will be to put the verb in the middle of the sentence because that is the kind of 
verb positioning-intention that is available in that society’.   
I simply do not know if Polanyi had any of this in mind but it wasn’t the kind of thinking that 
became widespread, certainly not in the analysis of scientific knowledge, until the early 
1970s.  But whether he did think about it or not, I am completely sure you cannot understand 
the notion of tacit knowledge without understanding that collectivities are the location of 
much of it, and no amount of arguing about the correct usage of the word ‘knowledge’, and 
‘knower’, and ‘knowing’, and what Polanyi intended, will change that. 
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